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ABSTRACT

This paper suggests that human values play a central role in communication and in the conceptualization of social judgment theory's fundamental terms: attitude and ego-involvement. It contends that values are the basis of an individual's attitude or category system and that one's level of ego-involvement in an issue is a function of (1) the importance of values associated with the topic and (2) the strength of the relationship between the issue and values. The paper posits the need for a value index of ego-involvement and provides guidelines for the development of such an instrument based on the Rokeach Value Survey, describing the advantages such an index would have over existing measures of ego-involvement. (Author/FL)

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HUMAN VALUES AND EGO-INVOLVEMENT: TOWARD THE CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION AND OPERATIONAL PRECISION OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT THEORY

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ABSTRACT

This study demonstrates that human values play a central role in human communication and in the conceptualization of social judgment theory's fundamental terms: attitude and ego-involvement. Values are the underlying basis of an individual's attitude or category system, and one's level of ego-involvement in an issue is a function of (1) the importance of value(s) associated with the topic and (2) the strength of the relationship between the issue and value(s).

The essay also demonstrates the need for a value index of ego-involvement and provides guidelines for its development. Specifically, the Rokeach Value Survey is adapted for use as an ego-involvement measure. Advantages of this index over extant measures of ego-involvement are also described.

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HUMAN VALUES AND EGO-INVOLVEMENT: TOWARD THE CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION AND OPERATIONAL PRECISION OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT THEORY

Values and Communication

Milton Rokeach commented on the relationship between the study of human values and the social sciences:

> . . . the consequences of human values will be manifested in virtually all phenomena that social scientists might consider worth investigating and understanding . . . More than any other concept, it is an intervening variable that shows promise of being able to unify the apparently diverse interests of all the sciences concerned with human behavior . . . It is the main dependent variable in the study of culture, society, and personality, and the main independent variable in the study of social attitudes and behavior. It is difficult for me to conceive of any problem social scientists might be interested in that would not deeply implicate human values (1973, pp. 3, ix).

To be sure, there are those who have long acknowledged the centrality of values in the study of human communication. In rhetorical theory, for example, the "good reasons" philosophy (e.g., Wallace, 1963) is predicated on the inextricable relationship between human values and the nature of human communication. Eubanks and Baker (1962) expressed the relationship succinctly when they observed, "In a word, the central function of rhetoric is to crystallize and transmit human values, the 'what-fors' of a culture (p. 3)." The same authors also stressed the relationship between human values and the causes of communicative behavior:

> Human values are . . . the ultimate ground of human action: they are also a concomitant of human freedom . . . Not only do they supply the <u>criteria</u> for choosing among alternative courses of conduct, they may also serve as desirable (and possible) <u>goals</u> or states that are critical in human transactions beyond the homeostatic level of drive-reduction (pp. 1, 7-8).

Similarly, Gregg (1966) stressed the vital role that values play in human communication. Arguing a position largely based on Boulding's The Image (1961), he pointed out that a person's "knowledge structure consists not only of images of fact but also of images of value which offer standards of judgment on some basis of good or bad (p. 84)." The interaction of individuals' perceptions and their attitudes toward their perceptions has a definite impact on an individual's communicative behavior. Gregg indicates that:

> . . . the quality, intensity, shape, and force of images comprising an individual's symbolic reality will influence the character of his communication, and in a similar fashion a person's symbolic reality is to some extent shaped and colored by the communicative messages he received (p. 85).

Clearly, values do play an important role in both the manner we send and interpret messages. Rokeach (1969) summarizes the powerful force of values in shaping one's opinions and behavior:

> Once a value is internalized it becomes, consciously or unconsciously, a standard or criterion for guiding action, for developing and maintaining attitudes toward relevant objects and situations, for justifying one's own and others' actions and attitudes, for morally judging self and others, and for comparing self with others (p. 160).

Yet, for the most part, communication "theories" in the behavioral sciences have ignored or sidestepped the importance of values.[1] Even the detailed investigations of those seeking to discover communication "rules" or consistent patterns of behavior (e.g. Ellis & Fisher, 1975; Nofsinger, 1975, 1976) have failed to consider insights the rules or patterns discovered can provide into the value structure of an individual or of a society.

One viewpoint which does directly address the role between values and communicative behavior is the theory of social judgment advanced by

Muzafer Sherif and his associates (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, 1965). Basically, the theory posits that an individual makes communicative judgments on the basis of values or standards, which are internalized from interaction with reference groups. The individual is "ego-involved" in a given issue to the extent that the values embedded in the issue are important or salient to the individual. In turn, the degree of involvement affects one's perceptions of messages about the topic. Specifically, the greater the involvement, the more likely an individual will exaggerate the distance between his/her position and a counter-communication. This phenomenon is known as the contrast effect. On the other hand, the lower the involvement in the issue, the more likely an individual will minimize the distance between his/her attitude and a counter-communication. This phenomenon is known as the assimilation effect. Not surprisingly, research has consistently demonstrated that the greater the ego-involvement in a topic, the less attitude change that occurs following exposure to a belief-discrepant communication (e.g., Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965).

A number of issues - - conceptual, methodological, and operational - - have impeded the development of social judgment theory as a theory of human communication.[2] Perhaps the most fundamental difficulty is that the relationship between values and judgmental behavior is not closely defined in statements of the theory. One consequence of this failing is ambiguity in the nature of the theory's pivotal variable, ego-involvement. After reviewing the various definitions of ego-involvement, Wilmot (1971a) concluded that "At this point in time, it is impossible to define ego-involvement precisely" (p. 435). It is hoped that this essay, by returning to the fundamental tenets of social judgment theory, will make the conceptual meaning of ego-involvement more

apparent.

Social Judgment Theory: Basic Principals

The primary concerns of social judgment theory are best expressed by Sherif and Sherif (1967):

> . . . the approach is not merely concerned with how people behave when they experience tension, dissonance, incongruity, or imbalance but in specifying the conditions (variables) that will produce such experiences. Its aim is to predict the degree of discrepancy between a communication and the person's attitude that will arouse psychological discomfiture, to predict his reaction to the communication, and to predict how it will or will not affect his attitude. It aims to specify the conditions in which an individual will be susceptible to attempts to change his attitude or be resistant to change even before anyone has attempted to alter his view (pp. 107-108).

It is apparent from the preceding description that social judgment theory is a member of the consistency theory family. Equally important, however, is the recognition that social judgment theory is a member of the class of "reference group" theories, which purport to ". . . systematize the determinants and consequences of those processes of evaluation and self-appraisal in which the individual takes the values or standards of other individuals and groups as a comparative frame of reference (Merton, 1957, p. 238)." That social judgment theory is a reference group theory and that values play a pivotal role in that theory is readily seen in the following statement by Sherif and Cantril (1947):

> We learn (or sometimes determine) what values, goals, standards, or norms are desirable for us. These become incorporated as our values, our goals. The referential framework of the ego is therefore these values, goals, standards, or norms which have become so large a part of what we refer to as me. These values, goals, standards, or norms which become our attitudes are represented by, set by, or created by group activities and social situations that form the constellation of social relationships with which we come in contact. Major attitudes are thus derived from groups to which we learn to relate ourselves as members of: reference groups, membership groups (p. 114).

The importance of recognizing social judgment theory as a reference group theory is twofold. First, it defines the principal sources of an individual's attitudinal and value structure, the reference group. As Sherif and Hovland (1961) indicate, attitudes and values of reference groups are adopted "through an internalization process whereby the individual learns and accepts their [the reference group's] value categories or norms and status systems as his own (p. 90)." One would expect that knowledge of the values of an individual's reference groups would be a strong predictor of both the individual's own values and attitudes toward various issues. Previous research has, indeed, supported this contention (e.g., Sherif, 1948; Shibutani, 1955). Second, recognizing social judgment theory as a reference group theory establishes the inextricable relationship between human values and the ego; values serve as the "referential framework" of the ego. Consequently, one cannot accurately discuss "ego-involvement" in an issue without taking the individual's value structure into account, nor can one accurately measure ego-involvement without an instrument that directly taps value structure.

Unfortunately, values are not explicitly mentioned in the Sherif's definitions of ego-involvement, e.g., "importance" or "relevance" (Sherif and Sherif, 1967, p. 134), and "the arousal, singly or in combination, of the individual's commitments or stands in the context of appropriate situations, be they interpersonal relations or a judgment task in actual life or an experiment" (Sherif,Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965, p. 65). Moreover, none of Wilmot's (1971a) indictments against the nature or definition of ego-involvement involve the role of human values. Herein lies the source of much of the conceptual ambiguity in the variable.

As Sherif et al. (1973) point out, the conception of the self or ego is the foundation of social judgment theory. The self is viewed as a system of attitude structures which is revealed by characteristic behaviors toward objects and classes of objects (Sherif & Cantril, 1947; Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965; Sherif & Sherif, 1969). Evidence from both psychophysical (e.g., Sherif, 1936, 1937) and psychosocial (Hovland & Sherif, 1953) data indicates that patterned, consistent judgmental behavior is based on scales or standards for comparison. Sherif and Sherif (1967) argue that "a judgment process underlies the behavior in which the individual uses a set of categories for comparing and evaluating items within the stimulus domain in question (p. 114)." The set of categories is the operational definition of attitude (Sherif & Sherif, 1967), and the reference scales or standards which determine the individual's own categories are formed from ". . . the ways of life, the relationships within and between groups, and their value systems (Sherif & Sherif, 1967, p. 110)."

The argument contained in the preceding paragraph is a critical one: the values of an individual, internalized from relevant reference groups, are the underlying basis of an individual's category system, i.e., his attitude. It is also the case that values play an integral role in social judgment theory's pivotal variable, ego-involvement.

Specifically, the degree to which the self or ego is involved in an issue is a function of (1) the priority of values associated with the issue in an individual's value hierarchy or value structure (Stiffler, 1968; Rodgers, 1969; Sherif et al., 1973) and (2) the strength of the relationship between the value and the issue (Sherif & Cantril, 1947; Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, 1965; Kiesler, Collins, & Miller, 1969). Bergamin (1971)

provides empirical support for this analysis of ego-involvement. By manipulating importance of different values concerning the church as well as their relevance to the experimental issue, she was able to create differing levels of ego-involvement. Specifically, those subjects who linked the church to values peripheral to the individual were much less ego-involved with the church than those subjects who linked the church to values central to the individual.

Since human values are inextricably woven into definitions of both attitude and ego-involvement, there is some tendency to merge the two terms conceptually. There is little question that attitude and degree of ego-involvement are correlated. Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall (1965), for example, note that extremity of attitude and level of ego-involvement are positively correlated. However, the two terms are conceptually distinct, if empirically related. While an attitude is "the individual's set of categories for evaluating a stimulus domain (Sherif & Sherif, 1967, p. 115), " ego-involvement is the importance of the value(s) associated with an issue to an individual and the strength of the relationship between the issue and value(s).

Operationally, more serious problems of interpretation result from equating ego-involvement with attitude. An individual's attitude, his category system, consists of a most acceptable position, other acceptable positions (latitude of acceptance), unacceptable positions (latitude of rejection), and neutral positions (latitude of noncommitment). Most research employing social judgment theory has used the latitudes of indices of ego-involvement, while using the most acceptable position as the measure of attitude (e.g., Wilmot, 1971b; Sherif et al., 1973). The contradiction between conceptual and operational definitions of attitude is pointed out by Sereno and Bodaken (1972),

". . . if Sherif's conceptualization is valid - - i.e., attitude consists not only of a most acceptable position but also latitudes of acceptance, non-commitment, and rejection, - - then it seems imperative that in measuring attitude change, these identical criterion measures be used (p. 157)." Incidentally, Sereno and Bodaken's view is now apparently shared by Sherif et al. (1973) who note that ". . . indicators based on all three latitudes . . . are more discriminating and more veridical to theory and findings than a single latitude containing only partial information on structure (p. 326)."

However, Sereno and Bodaken's (1972) solution is to employ the latitudes as the operational definition of both attitude and ego-involvement. Subjects are classified as highly or lowly involved on the basis of the size of their latitude of rejection, and pre-to-post-test changes in the latitudes as well as the most acceptable position are taken as measures of attitude change. The difficulty with this approach is that it is impossible to know whether attitude change has occurred or whether subjects have simply become less ego-involved in the issue. If significant decreases occur in the size of the latitude of rejection of the highly involved individual following exposure to a belief-discrepant communication (as is typically the case) it is just as reasonable to conclude that the individual has become less ego-involved as it is to say that the attitude has changed markedly. Again, definitions of attitude and involvement are conceptually distinct, and to operationally join them results in questionable interpretations of data.

It has been demonstrated that human values play a central role in human communication and in the conceptualization of social judgment theory's fundamental terms: attitude and ego-involvement. Values are the underlying basis of an individual's attitude or category system, and one's level of ego-

involvement in an issue is a function of (1) the importance of value(s) associated with the topic and (2) the strength of the relationship between the issue and value(s).

Moreover, there is a need to develop an instrument which directly taps an individual's value structure. As Sherif et al. (1973) commented, "Realistic research on attitude formation and change will eventually link degree of identification with reference groups, the priority of their normative concerns [values], and personal involvements with the individual's behavior over time (p. 327)."

Developing a Value Index of Ego-Involvement

The first step, of course, toward developing a valid index of ego-involvement is to align conceptual and operational definitions of ego-involvement by introducing values directly into instruments which measure the concept. Two value instruments have enjoyed widespread usage, albeit for different purposes than that of measuring ego-involvement. The first, the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values (1960), is based upon Springer's (1928) theory of six "ideal" types of men and measures the strength of six personal values: Theoretical, Economic, Aesthetic, Social, Political, and Religious. As Simon (1970) pointed out, the instrument has been used most successfully to discriminate between known groups. For example, art students typically score highest on the aesthetic value, clergymen on the religious value, and so on.

The second value instrument was developed by Rokeach (1973). The Value Survey measures two generalized types of values: terminal and instrumental. Terminal values refer to desirable end-states of existence (e.g., "freedom", "a world at peace"), while instrumental values refer to desirable modes of behavior (e.g., "broadminded", "honest"). In the Rokeach instrument, the

subject is asked to rank order 18 terminal and 18 instrumental values in terms of their importance to the individual.

The Rokeach instrument is to be preferred over the Study of Values as a potential measure of ego-involvement for two reasons. First, the Value Survey encompasses both terminal and instrumental values, while the Study of Values only employs terminal values (Rokeach, 1973, p. 7). As Rokeach demonstrates throughout his book, terminal values and instrumental values "may play different roles in different areas of social life (p. 326)." The Study of Values, by focusing exclusively on terminal values, loses power in discriminating individuals, for example, who desire similar ends but choose different means (instrumental values) of attaining them. The issue is akin to the attitude-behavior discrepancy question as discussed by Doob (1947), who noted that individuals with similar attitudes may learn quite different behaviors associated with that attitude. The Value Survey, on the other hand, can discern these variations by measuring both types of values.

The second reason that the Value Survey is preferred to the Study of Values as a measure of ego-involvement is that it is less tied to the known-groups procedure. Employing known groups makes the attribution of effect to the hypothesized cause (e.g., ego-involvement) a difficult one, since the subjects are not randomly assigned to conditions and since other differences (e.g., age, intelligence) between the groups could as easily account for observed differences on the dependent measure as the independent variable (Kiesler, Collins, & Miller, 1969; Wilmot, 1971a). It <u>is</u> important to understand that the source of an individual's value system is his reference groups; it is less important when dealing with sizeable heterogenous populations to know the <u>specific</u> reference groups from whom the values were internalized. Inasmuch as this is the typical

perspective taken in speech communication research employing social judgment theory (known groups are not employed), the Rokeach Value Survey seems a better measure of values than does the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values.

Both instruments, however, share a similar methodological deficiency: they are both ipsative in nature. That is, "as an examinee's score on one value increases, his score on some other value must ipso facto decrease (Simon, 1970, p. 273)." The rather low test-retest reliabilities of the instrumental values on the Rokeach instrument (8 out of 18 are below .60) indicates that many of the values are approximately equal in an absolute sense and thus can be ordered or ranked in a variety of ways (Rokeach, 1973). Clearly, an absolute indication of a value's importance to an individual would be more precise than merely the ranking of the value. For example, values ranked 1-3 may be of approximately equal importance, with value 4 much less important. There is no way of reliably discovering this occurrence in the Rokeach procedure.

Fortunately, the ipsative ordinality of the Value Survey can be transformed to intervality be adopting a scoring procedure derived by Rosenberg (1956) for value measures. Instead of rank-ordering the 18 terminal and 18 instrumental values, the subject indicates how important each value is to him independently. He does so by rating each value on a scale of, say, 1 (extremely unimportant in my life) to 11 (extremely important in my life). Not only can one then measure differences within the terminal and instrumental classifications, but between them as well.

Of course, providing an index of the importance of various values to the individual is only half the information necessary to calculate an individual's level of involvement with an issue. Specifically, one must also know the

strength of the relationship between the value and the issue. Rosenberg (1956) also provides an index by which this relationship can be measured. The individual simply rates on a scale of, say, 1 (extremely unrelated to my position on the issue) to 7 (extremely related to my position on the issue) the degree of relevance or salience of the value to the issue in question.

The use of the Rokeach Value Survey with modifications suggested by Rosenberg yields the following information: importance ratings of 36 values (18 terminal, 18 instrumental) and judgments of perceived salience or relevance between each of the values and the issue in question. In sum, the data necessary for calculating an individual's level of ego-involvement in a manner consistent with social judgment theory are obtained.[3] A copy of the modified instrument is found in the Appendix.

The selection of values that will eventually be used to determine an individual's level of involvement is guided by one overriding observation made by Rokeach (1973): that values discriminate between individuals of varying attitudinal positions. Consequently, to use all values on Rokeach's instrument in the determination of involvement or choose a priori the same values upon which to discriminate people holding congruent attitudes from those holding discrepant ones is unwarranted. Moreover, since the importance and relevance of values characteristic of individuals holding a particular position on an issue discriminates between levels of ego-involvement on the topic, the search for discriminating values should begin here. Specifically, since importance ratings of values should be relatively inflexible, but relevance ratings are presumably topic-specific, one can begin to discriminate between levels of involvement by examining the relevance scores in some detail. The method of discrimination can be described in the following manner for those in agreement

with the issue, and is identical for those who oppose the issue.

The first step is to create groups of high and low ego-involvement. Sum all 36 scores on relevance for each individual who initially favors the topic, and divide by 36 to provide a mean relevance rating. To increase the variance between the groups, divide the total group into thirds, with the top third tentatively identified as the highly involved group and the bottom third classified as the lowly involved group (Kerlinger, 1973).

The next step is to isolate those values - - both terminal and instrumental - - which effectively discriminate between the highly and lowly involved group members. Sanathanan (1975) suggests a combination of discriminant and factor analyses to obtain the final set of discriminating values as "a compromise between effeciency of classification . . . and parsimony in future prediction (p. 246)." The specific steps to be employed are as follows. First, perform a stepwise discriminant analysis using all 36 values, choosing an inclusion level of $F \geq 1.0$. While this procedure eliminates those values which obviously do not distinguish the two groups, it also retains many values which possess little discriminating power in and of themselves because they are highly correlated with other values. This problem of multicollinearity if obviated to a great extent by following the discriminant analysis with a principal components factor analysis with orthogonal rotation on the remaining values. A simple structure criteria is then applied to the resultant factors, and those values failing to meet the criteria are eliminated. Finally, a second stepwise discriminant analysis is applied to the remaining values to obtain the final set of discriminating variables. From this set of values, calculations of an individual's level of ego-involvement can now be made.

The method for calculating involvement based on the remaining values is also described by Rosenberg. (1956) Stated simply, the rating assigned to the importance of each value by the subject is multiplied by the rating assigned to its perceived relationship to the attitudinal issue. For example, if "freedom" is assigned a "6" in importance and a "5" in relevance to the topic, the score for that combination would be 30. All such crossproducts would be summed, then divided by the number of values employed. The resultant single score would be the indicant of the individual's level of ego-involvement. The higher the score, the greater the ego-involvement. The formula for ego-involvement, then is $\frac{Exy}{n}$, with x being the rating of the value's importance to the individual, y being the rating of the value's relevance to the topic, and n being the total number of values used in the computation.

This formula for ego-involvement assumes, of course, that the ratings of importance and relevance are of equal worth. There is no theoretic warrant either in social judgment theory or in Rokeach's work for differentially "weighting" either score. Although terminal values may be more "basic," there is no guarantee that they will apply to a particular issue. While differential weighting may be appropriate in some conditions, it is unwise and unwarranted to do so at this time.

Three distinct advantages arise from the use of this new measure as the operational definition of ego-involvement. First, the index increases the consistency between the conceptualization of ego-involvement and its operationalization. Instead of relying on self-report measures or latitudes to <u>infer</u> involvement and <u>hoping</u> that importance and salience of values are reflected in those responses, the new instrument provides a direct, and, presumably, accurate reflection of both the importance of different values

to the individual as well as their perceived relationship to an attitudinal issue - - the two conceptual components of ego-involvement.

Second, the new instrument is void of most of the artifact associated with other measures of involvement. A prime source of artifact with self-report and measures employing latitudes is the artifactually high ratings given to unimportant issues (Kelman, 1962; Rhine & Polowniak, 1971; Sherif et al., 1973; Bodaken & Gaske, 1975). The reason for this phenomenon, it is argued, is that extant measures of involvement do not assess the strength of the relationship between values and the attitude in question. An issue may be germane to an irrelevant or unimportant value or unrelated to an important value. In both instances, the subject is likely to indicate that the position is "important," but will depress the rating when asked to compare the attitude with one that is intimately tied to a high-rating value (Bergamin, 1971, p. 223).

Moreover, the new involvement index lessens the probability of artifact associated with the individual's own position, since the individual is asked merely to assess the perceived relationship between values and the issue regardless of the actual attitude on the subject (Edwards, 1957; Sherif and Hovland, 1961; Sherif et al., 1973). By separating the measurement of ego-involvement from that of attitude, and by measuring level of ego-involvement prior to any assessment of attitude, other artifactual problems associated with measurement of attitude which confound inferences of involvement are also drastically reduced.

A third advantage of the involvement measure is the elimination of the necessity for dichotomizing subjects into levels of involvement. As Reich (1969) and Kerlinger and Pedhazur (1973) pointed out, lumping data into

categories distorts or hides potentially important differences within the category. The proposed involvement instrument is a continuous measure of ego-involvement and thus can avoid the data loss necessarily ensured with dichotomizing.

In essence, the proposed instrument should offer greater precision and accuracy in predicting communicative behavior and subsequent attitude change than other instruments used to measure ego-involvement as well as providing the necessary conceptual consistency between theory and operational definition. Research is currently underway which directly compares the value index and other measures of ego-involvement as predictors of attitude change and as classification methods for discriminating highly and lowly involved subjects.

FOOTNOTES

[1]One indication of our neglect of values is its lack of mention in contemporary communication theory texts. For example, the term is not even referenced in Mortenson and Sereno's Advances in Communication Theory (1973) and received scant and superficial treatment in their Foundations of Communication Theory (1970) book of readings.

[2]For a review of methodological and operational deficiencies in social judgment research, the reader should consult Wilmot (1971b) and the author's doctoral dissertation.

[3]A pilot study conducted by the author compared the original rank-order instrument with the revised instrument. Twenty-eight subjects completed both the original rank-order instrument and the modification. Correlations among the rankings were computed by means of the Kendall's tau correlation statistic which is appropriate when a number of tied ranks are present in the data (Siegel, 1956). Thirty-two of possible thirty-six correlations were significant at the .05 level or greater.

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APPENDIX

Rokeach Value Survey Modification

PART I

Below is a list of 36 values in random order. Your task is to rate their importance to YOU, as guiding principles in YOUR life. Please indicate on a scale of 1 (extremely unimportant) to 11 (extremely important) how important each of these values is to YOU in YOUR life.

When you have completed rating all the values, go back and check over your list. Feel free to make changes. Make sure that the end result truly represents your values.

---

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Extremely unimportant in my life — Extremely important in my life

_____ A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT (lasting contribution)
_____ TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship)
_____ LOVING (affectionate, tender)
_____ COURAGEOUS (standing up for your beliefs)
_____ INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
_____ NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack)
_____ AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)
_____ CHEERFUL (lighthearted, joyful)
_____ MATURE LOVE (sexual and spiritual intimacy)
_____ RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)
_____ HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)
_____ A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)
_____ AN EXCITING LIFE (a stimulating, active life)
_____ OBEDIENT (dutiful, respectful)
_____ LOGICAL (consistent, rational)
_____ POLITE (courteous, well-mannered)
_____ HONEST (sincere, truthful)
_____ IMAGINATIVE (daring, creative)

_____ HAPPINESS (contentedness)
_____ A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)
_____ FAMILY SECURITY (taking care of loved ones)
_____ SELF-RESPECT (self-esteem)
_____ FREEDOM (independence, free choice)
_____ SALVATION (saved, eternal life)
_____ EQUALITY (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)
_____ SELF-CONTROLLED (restrained, self-disciplined)
_____ BROADMINDED (open-minded)
_____ SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, admiration)
_____ INTELLECTUAL (intelligent, reflective)
_____ INNER HARMONY (freedom from inner conflict)
_____ CLEAN (neat, tidy)
_____ CAPABLE (competent, effective)
_____ WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)
_____ A COMFORTABLE LIFE (a prosperous life)
_____ FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)
_____ PLEASURE (an enjoyable, leisurely life)

PART II

We are also interested in your views on a couple of issues which lately have received a good deal of public attention. Below is an issue and the 36 values. Without indicating your actual position on the issue for the moment, please indicate on a scale of 1 (extremely unrelated) to 7 (extremely related) the degree of relevance you see between the issue and the values. That is, please indicate the degree to which YOU think each value is related to YOUR position on the issue.

---

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Extremely unrelated to my position — Extremely related to my position

THE POSSIBLE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN CALIFORNIA

_____ A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT (lasting contribution)
_____ TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship
_____ LOVING (affectionate, tender)
_____ COURAGEOUS (standing up for your beliefs)
_____ INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
_____ NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack)
_____ AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)
_____ CHEERFUL (lighthearted, joyful)
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_____ HONEST (sincere, truthful)
_____ IMAGINATIVE (daring, creative)

_____ HAPPINESS (contentedness)
_____ A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)
_____ FAMILY SECURITY (taking care of loved ones)
_____ SELF-RESPECT (self-esteem)
_____ FREEDOM (independence, free choice)
_____ SALVATION (saved, eternal life)
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_____ SELF-CONTROLLED (restrained, self-disciplined)
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